

RECOMMENDATION #7

The Deputy Director (Administration) should personally review the status of the Agency's Safety Program, and take steps to insure that a program sufficient to meet the demands of the Agency is developed.

SUPPLEMENTARY

Underlying this recommendation the Survey on page 31 makes the following comments or recommendations:

- a. That CIA does not have a sufficiently developed safety program.
- b. That higher grades and additional positions are a prerequisite to a satisfactory program.
- c. That explosives and dangerous chemicals are stored improperly.
- d. That construction plans are not being adequately coordinated with the CIA Safety Office.

ACTION

The Security Office has submitted its over-all safety program to the Deputy Director (Support) for review and approval. A copy of the program is attached.

The Security Office has experienced difficulty in finding fully qualified and experienced safety men to fill the two safety officer slots presently available. One position has been filled continuously and the second position has only been filled temporarily for a few months. The incumbent of the second position has indicated he intends to leave soon.

In addition, an enlarged staff is believed necessary to carry out the full safety program.

Action has accordingly been initiated to analyze both the work load and the level of competence required in order to develop an adequate T/O. This will be completed in the near future.

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RECOMMENDATION #7 (Continued)

The tentative opinion of the Security Office is that an adequate T/O to carry out the Safety Program is as follows:

- 1 - Safety Officer, GS-11
- 1 - Assistant Safety Officer, GS-13
- 1 - Safety Inspector, GS-11
- 1 - Clerk-Stenographer, GS-5.

Action has been initiated by this office to have offices that utilize hazardous chemicals and explosives relocated in a more desirable location. Two reports originated by this office have been sent to the Chief, DD/P/TSS advising him that the relocation of TSS facilities in the South Building attic is essential to the welfare of Agency personnel.

Construction plans prepared by the Real Estate and Construction Division/LO and the General Services Administration are being coordinated with the CIA Safety Officer to the extent practicable because of the understaffing of the Safety Officer function.

As a matter of interest, the following statistics reflect the activity of the Safety Officer during the period of January 1954 through July 1954:

Fire and Safety Survey Reports	2
Special Safety Investigations	89
Floor loading decisions	46
Fire Drills (Buildings)	18
C.B. Evacuations (Air Raid Drill) (Buildings)	28
Inspections re Construction, Remodeling, Moving	15
Review of Emergency Evacuation Plans	8
Emergency Planning Conferences and Meetings	12
Safety Meetings	2

ATTACHMENT TO RECOMMENDATION #7

CIA SAFETY PROGRAM

A basic CIA Safety Program would include the following:

1. A semi-annual inspection of all Agency buildings with a detailed report and corrective recommendations forwarded to the offices concerned.
2. Annual fire drills in all Agency buildings and a detailed report of findings and recommendations forwarded to the offices concerned.
3. Quarterly inspections of all Agency warehouses and detailed reports forwarded to the offices concerned.
4. Annual inspections of out-of-town installations and detailed reports forwarded to the offices concerned.
5. A review of plans and specifications for new construction prior to initiation of work.
6. The establishment of Area Safety Officers and a program of appropriate training for these Officers.
7. The review of all plans for the movement and relocation of safes, safe files, etc.
8. Attendance of the Safety Officer or his designee at meetings of the Federal Safety Council.
9. A periodic review of artificial lighting conditions and technical testing as necessary.
10. Technical tests in locations where gasoline operated equipment is used indoors.
11. Coordination with the CIA Emergency Planning Officer with respect to the safety and fire aspects of Agency evacuation plans.
12. The procuring and showing of appropriate films concerning safety and fire hazards.
13. The keeping and posting of statistical data for accident frequency rates, etc.

ATTACHMENT TO RECOMMENDATION #7 (Continued)

14. An automotive safety program.
15. Attendance at Federal and National Safety Council Schools to gain knowledge of new developments.
16. The procuring of samples, where appropriate, of materials used within the Agency and arranging for tests to determine inflammability, toxicity, etc.
17. Periodic checks of machinery with respect to guards, grounding, eye protection, etc.
18. A current safety poster program.

The above represents a basic safety program for CIA and as experience develops, it is entirely probable that this program will be refined or additional items will be added.

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RECOMMENDATION #11

The Director of Security should review critically the justification for each of the [] Agency unlisted telephones and the 162 badges and limited passes issued to non-CIA employees and determine the appropriate action to be taken.

SUPPLEMENTARY

It is inferred from this recommendation and the related text that the Inspector General is principally interested in assurance that the policies and controls underlying the use of unlisted telephones and the issuance of badges and passes to non-CIA employees are at an optimum level compatible with practical needs.

ACTION

A review has been made of the justification for each unlisted telephone and of each pass and badge issued to non-CIA employees. No action was considered necessary and the policies and controls in effect are considered adequate and effective.

On the matter of unlisted telephones, the procedure in the Security Office is to conduct personal interviews with each requester of an unlisted telephone to determine the need from a security viewpoint of such a telephone and to insure that its proposed use is primarily to permit telephone contacts between Headquarters and covert facilities or calls to persons in the Agency from visiting outsiders without disclosure of Agency interest in pertinent matters or individuals. The use of an unlisted telephone for discussion of classified matter is, of course, prohibited as it is on all telephones.

As reported by the Inspector General, there are [] unlisted telephones in the Agency. Of this number [] are in the DAF complex, [] in the Logistics Office, and [] in the Security Office. The remaining [] are distributed among other offices of the Agency, none of which has more than 3.

There is now an established procedure in the Security Office for conducting periodic surveys of unlisted telephones to insure current security needs therefor, and compliance with security requirements. A survey under this procedure is now in progress. It is believed that this inspection procedure will provide adequate control on the justification for unlisted telephones.

With respect to the issuance of regular badges to non-CIA employees, there is close control of the small number (27) issued. These are issued only at the direction of the Director of Security or higher authority. In every case the justification is clear. Examples are certain National Security Council personnel, certain members of General Mark Clark Committee. A full security clearance is required prior to issuance, the individuals are fingerprinted, photographed, required to read the CIA security regulations and an extract of the Espionage laws, sign a Secrecy Agreement, and must attend the Security Indoctrination conducted by the Security Office.

With respect to the issuance of limited building passes and the controls over their use, the situation is considered both adequate and secure. Such passes are issued only in cases where there is an unquestionable practical need certified to by a responsible official. Reaffirmation of continuing need is accomplished in two ways. First, all limited passes bear a stipulated expiration date which is never more than one year from date of issuance. There is reexamination of the justification prior to the issuance of each subsequent pass. Secondly, each use of a limited pass must be recorded in a log book maintained at each building entrance. Such use is then recorded in a consolidated log book maintained in the Badge Office which reflects the total visits of each pass holder. Thus there is continuing verification of the justification for the pass based upon actual frequency of use.

Each limited pass holder receives a security indoctrination and briefing appropriate to the duties he is authorized to perform within CIA buildings. Consultants receiving limited passes, for example, are required to read the CIA Security Regulations and to attend the Security Indoctrination. In some few cases where a consultant cannot arrange to visit Washington, for the formal indoctrination, an individual briefing is arranged.

Further security controls are built into limited building passes, whenever appropriate, by limiting passes to essential buildings only or to certain hours of the day. In addition, limited building passes may not be used to receive or escort visitors.

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RECOMMENDATION #13

The status of the Inspection Division should be changed from a division to a staff since it is not a line command function.

ACTION

This recommendation was implemented on 29 July 1954.

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RECOMMENDATION #11

The Physical Security Branch should be made a division and five additional people be added to the P/O.

ACTION

This recommendation has been tentatively and unofficially put into effect in anticipation of similar recommendations said to be contained in a study being completed by the Management Staff/ED(S). No decision will be made as to the number of additional personnel which may be needed until the manpower needs as reflected in the Management study have been formally authorized.

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RECOMMENDATION #20-5

On page 25, paragraphs 5 and 6 call attention to the fact that CIA safe files are as secure as is desirable but that they can be improved by affixing a device which corrects significant and dangerous defects.

ACTION

The necessary modification kits have been procured and are now in stock. All Field stations have been directed to affix them to all Field safe files and appropriate instructions have been issued.

The greater number of Headquarters safe files poses a serious problem. The work load involved has been analyzed, and the Director of Logistics has been requested to provide the necessary labor. It is estimated that it will take one year to carry out the modification program.

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RECOMMENDATION #20-a

Page 37 of the Survey Report states that overseas surveys listed in the schedule for inspection in FY 1955 should only be done after coordination with the Inspector General.

ACTION

The Director of Security concurs. Any inspections conducted overseas by the Inspection Staff will, as a routine matter, be coordinated with the Inspector General.

RECOMMENDATION #6

The Deputy Director (Administration) and the Director of Security in coordination with the Deputy Director (Plans) should study the problem of emergency destruction and make recommendations to the DCI as to where responsibilities lie and how a flexible emergency program on a world-wide scope can be developed and implemented.

SUPPLEMENTARY

The text on pages 10 and 11 concerning the emergency destruction program contains the following statements:

- a. Responsibility for developing an overseas emergency destruction program has not been clearly assigned (p. 10, paragraph 2).
- b. Policy and program planning appear logically to be the responsibility of the Security Office (p. 10, paragraph 3).
- c. The Security Office should draft an emergency program (p. 10, paragraph 4).
- d. Attention should be paid to the development of sufficient and adequate devices and methods for the quick destruction of classified files and equipment (p. 10, paragraphs 5 and 6).

ACTION

The Director of Security does not agree that the Security Office should assume basic responsibility for the development of an overseas emergency destruction program, as may be inferred from the supplementary items taken from the text of the Survey Report. Since July 1953 the Emergency Planning Officer has been conferring with the DD/P component in the development of policy guidance governing emergency planning for overseas Field stations.

Appropriate instructions have been issued to the Field to cover planning for emergency evacuation and redeployment, including planning for emergency destruction of documents, in the overseas Field installations through the medium of [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] This office has been informed by representatives of PFC/DD/P that all of the country plans prepared by the overseas installations pursuant to these instructions now contain provisions for emergency planning as described above.

RECOMMENDATION #6 (Continued)

With respect to devices for the quick destruction of classified files and equipment, the Inspection Staff of the Security Office has been working with TGS. Numerous devices and methods for the destruction of files have been explored, but as of the present time the problem has not been adequately solved. Continuing attention is being given to this problem.

RECOMMENDATION #8

It is undesirable that CIA must depend on a guard force responsible to another agency with full Civil Service job protection. The DD/S and the Director of Security, in collaboration with General Counsel, should determine what administrative and legal problems must be overcome in order to develop a guard force trained and controlled by CIA.

ACTION

The matter of an independent CIA guard force has heretofore been given a great amount of consideration. It has been determined by the DD/S that until the Agency is housed in one building, it is not feasible administratively to establish an independent guard force.

RECOMMENDATION #20-2 ^a

On pages 36 and 37 of the Survey Report, the recommendation is made that the Director of Security should undertake a study leading to a determination as to the most feasible method of centralizing responsibility for physical security inspections.

ACTION

The Director of Security has made a study of the feasibility of centralizing all physical security inspections and does not consider that such centralization would result in greater efficiency or security. At present, physical security inspections are conducted by the Physical Security Division. This type of inspection is a technical one and it is believed the function properly belongs in the Physical Security Division. The Security Support Division conducts inspections of covert installations and it is decidedly preferable from the standpoint of security that such inspections remain in the component of this office handling covert matters. The Inspection Staff conducts over-all security investigations as required. These investigations encompass all phases of security, of which physical security is one factor. Where technical assistance is desired as concerns physical security measures, such assistance is readily obtainable from the Physical Security Division.

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